The sanctions mitigation paradox in welfare to work benefit schemes by Eleveld, A.
VU Research Portal
The sanctions mitigation paradox in welfare to work benefit schemes
Eleveld, A.
published in
Comparative labor law & Policy Journal
2018
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
document license
Unspecified
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Eleveld, A. (2018). The sanctions mitigation paradox in welfare to work benefit schemes. Comparative labor law




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 22. May. 2021
DATE DOWNLOADED: Tue Sep  8 06:04:33 2020
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
			                                                                
Anja Eleveld, The Sanctions Mitigation Paradox in Welfare to Work Benefit Schemes, 39
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'y J. 449 (2018).                                                 
ALWD 6th ed.                                                                         
Eleveld, A. ., The sanctions mitigation paradox in welfare to work benefit schemes,
39(2) Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 449 (2018).                                           
APA 7th ed.                                                                          
Eleveld, A. (2018). The sanctions mitigation paradox in welfare to work benefit
schemes. Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 39(2), 449-474.                     
Chicago 7th ed.                                                                      
Anja Eleveld, "The Sanctions Mitigation Paradox in Welfare to Work Benefit Schemes,"
Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal 39, no. 2 (Winter 2018): 449-474              
McGill Guide 9th ed.                                                                 
Anja Eleveld, "The Sanctions Mitigation Paradox in Welfare to Work Benefit Schemes"
(2018) 39:2 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 449.                                                
MLA 8th ed.                                                                          
Eleveld, Anja. "The Sanctions Mitigation Paradox in Welfare to Work Benefit Schemes."
Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, vol. 39, no. 2, Winter 2018, p. 449-474.
HeinOnline.                                                                          
OSCOLA 4th ed.                                                                       
Anja Eleveld, 'The Sanctions Mitigation Paradox in Welfare to Work Benefit Schemes'
(2018) 39 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 449
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
   Conditions of the license agreement available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from  uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your  license, please use:
Copyright Information
THE SANCTIONS MITIGATION PARADOX IN
WELFARE TO WORK BENEFIT SCHEMES
Anja Eleveldt
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1990s European welfare states have adopted a wide range of
measures aimed at promoting labor market participation, including training
and work programs.I Where a quick return or entering in the labor market is
not possible, welfare recipients may be obliged to perform unpaid labor work
or useful communal services that-perhaps on a very long tertn-prepare
welfare recipients for the labor market. Recipients who fail to comply with
these measures will normally risk a work-related sanction (i.e., sanctions that
are imposed on recipients who fail to comply with welfare to work or
activation measures), varying from a reduction, suspension or termination of
their benefits. In line with European Union social policies,2 national social
policies in European welfare states have tended to classify these kind of
policies as policies of social inclusion. That is, policy makers predominantly
perceive work-related sanctions as a more or less efficient means to
incentivize recipients (of social assistance) to work. We find a similar
perspective on work-related sanctions in dominant strands of social policy
f Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, VU University Amsterdam. The author wants to thank two
anonymous reviewers for their very useful comments.
1. The turn to activation policies in Europe has been documented by various authors. See, e.g.,
ACTIVATION AND LABOUR MARKET REFORMS IN EUROPE: CHALLENGES TO SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP (Sigrid
Betzelt & Silke Bothfeld eds., 2011); AN OFFER YOU CAN'T REFUSE: WORKFARE IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE (Ivar Ledemel & Heather Tricky eds., 2001); RESHAPING WELFARE STATES AND
ACTIVATION REGIMES IN EUROPE (Amparo Serrano Pascual & Lars Magnusson eds., 2007).
2. Since 2008 European policies of "active inclusion" are guided by the goal of adequate income
support. However, the European Commission does not recognize that sanction-backed activation policies
(which are part of policies of "active inclusion") may have an adverse effect on the goal of adequate
income support. See the European Commission Recommendation, On the Active Inclusion of People
Excluded from the Labour Market, (EC) No. 867/2008/ of Oct. 3, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 307/11) and its
follow up documents: (1) Communication from the Commission, The European Platform against Poverty
and Social Exclusion: A European framework for social and territorial cohesion, SEC (2010) 1564 final,
Dec. 16, 2010, at 6; (2) Commission Staff Working Document. Social Investment Package, SWD (2013)
39 final, Feb. 20, 2013, at 13; (3) Communication from the Commission. Towards Social Investment for
Growth and Cohesion, COM (2013) 83 final, Oct. 20, 2013, at 10.
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scholarship.3 This stands in sharp contrast with the work of some critical
scholars. For example, Joel Handler has shown for over three decades how
sanction-backed welfare to work policies may result in the social exclusion
of the poor underclass.4 Welfare recipients, then, do not only face severe
financial problems if they receive a financial sanction, they are also prone to
being subjected to the arbitrary exercise of power of either the street-level
bureaucrat or the work supervisor.5 The vulnerability of working welfare
recipients for abusive practices on the "work floor" further increases due to
the absence of effective labor law regulations in most jurisdictions.6
In the spirit of Handler's work, this article explores the extent to which
the implementation of work-related sanctions violates the fundamental right
to minimum means of subsistence that has been enshrined in various
international treaties.7 Note that the violation of this right is connected to the
possible violation of other human rights as well, such as the prohibition on
compulsory labor8 and the right to freely chosen work.9 For example, the
threat of being left without means of subsistence may force the recipients to
participate in work activities they would not have chosen voluntarily. The
right to minimum means of subsistence is also related to the risk of being
subjected the exercise of arbitrary power, because in the absence of
alternative means of subsistence, the recipient may feel forced to accept the
3. Sarah Marchal & Natascha Van Mechelen, A New Kid in Town? Active Inclusion Elements in
European Minimum Income Schemes, 51 Soc. POL'Y & ADMIN. 171 (2017).
4. JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP AND WORKFARE IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN
EUROPE: THE PARADOX OF INCLUSION (2003).
5. This is also the point that is made in the republican theory of domination. According to Lovett,
in a relationship where there is an imbalance of power and where party or person A is dependent on the
party or person B, this party or person B will exercise arbitrary power over party or person A, unless the
exercise of power is effectively restrained by rules. See FRANK LOVEr, A GENERAL THEORY OF
DOMINATION AND JUSTICE 96 (2010). See also PHILIPPE PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS: A
REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY (2012). On the application of the republican theory
to welfare to work relationships, see Anja. Eleveld, Rules and the Reduction of Arbitrary Power in
Workfare Relationships (paper presented at the Seminar "Normative Perspectives on Working Welfare
Recipients," VU University Amsterdam, Nov. 4, 2016).
6. Amir Paz-Fuchs and Anja Eleveld argue that working recipients should (to a great extent) receive
the same employment protection as employees. See Amir Paz-Fuchs & Anja Eleveld, Workfare Revisited,
45 INDUS. L. J. 57, 58 (2015). On this issue, see also Noah D. Zats, What Welfare Requires from Work, 54
UCLA L. REV. 373 (2006); Vadin Mahmoudov, Are Workfare Participants Employees: Legal Issues
Presented by a Two-Tiered Labor Force, 1998 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 349 (1998);
Matthew Diller, Working Without a Job: The Social Messages of the New Workfare, 9 STAN. L. REV. 19
(1998).
7. See Section II, infra.
8. Article 4 European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR); Convention No. 29 International
Labour Organization (ILO); Art. 8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); and Art.
5 EU Charter of fundamental rights (ECFR). See also Elise Dermine, Activation Policies for the
Unemployed and the International Human Rights Case Law on the Prohibition ofForced Labour, 5 EUR.
J. HuM. RTS. 746-76 (2013).
9. Art. 23 UDHR; 1LO Convention No. 122; Art. 6 International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESR); and Art. 1 European Social Charter (ESC). See also Elise Dermine,
Activation Policies for the Unemployed and the International Human Rights Case Law on the Right to
Freely Chosen Work, in ACTIVATION POLICIES OF THE UNEMPLOYED, THE RIGHT TO WORK AND THE
DUTY TO WORK 139-77 (Elise Dermine & Daniel Dumont eds., 2014).
THE SANCTIONS MITIGATION PARADOX
behavior of the work supervisor, work that he or she otherwise would have
objected.
In order to assess the extent to which national sanction regimes violate
the fundamental right to minimum means of subsistence, I will compare the
strictness of work-related sanctions in twenty-five European welfare states
with the legislation of so-called mitigation clauses, such as discretionary
clauses, reparatory clauses, and hardship clauses. As such, this study adds to
the existing social policy literature for at least two reasons. First, the
implementation of mitigation clauses has been neglected for the most part in
comparative studies on activation policies.'0 Second, most of these studies
have focused on unemployment benefits instead of social assistance benefits
(of the last resort). From the viewpoint of fundamental rights it can be argued
that these latter benefits are more important."
The article is organized in the following way. Section II considers the
Conclusions of the supervising body of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the supervising body of the
European Social Charter (ESC), the European Committee of Social Rights
(ECSR), on work-related sanctions in social assistance legislation in various
European welfare states. Whereas this analysis reveals that the supervising
bodies value the adoption of mitigation clauses, Section III examines various
mitigation clauses that have been adopted in social assistance legislations.
This section also examines a less-well-known mitigation mechanism, namely
sanctioning of separate benefit components. Section IV constructs a sanction
indicator and compares for twenty-five European welfare states the sanction
indicator with the presence of mitigation mechanisms. Section V contains the
main conclusions and the outlook.
II. THE RIGHT TO MINIMUM MEANS OF SUBSISTENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES
National social assistance regimes increasingly prefer the
implementation of work-related sanctions over enabling measures such as
training programs and work projects, because, briefly, they are less expensive
10. These studies commonly focus on the duration and the percentage of the reduction of benefits.
See, e.g., Sarah Marchal & Natascha van Mechelen, Activation Strategies within European Minimum
Income Schemes (Gini Discussion Paper 87, 2013); Kristine Langenbucher, How Demanding are
Eligibility Criteria for Unemployment Benefits, Quantitative Indicators for OECD and EU Countries
(OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 166, 2015), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jrxtklzw8f2-en; Danielle Venn, Eligibility Criteria for Unemployment
Benefits: Quantitative Indicators for OECD and EUcountries, OECD Social (Employment and Migration
Working Paper No. 131, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers.
11. See, e.g., Langenbucher, supra note 10; Venn supra note 10.
4512018]
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and more effective.12 In the United Kingdom, at their peak, benefit sanctions
even exceeded the number of fines imposed in the criminal courts.13 What
we are interested in here, however, is whether benefit sanctions violate the
right to minimum means of subsistence.
The right to a minimum means of subsistence has been enshrined in
various International Treaties, such as Article 34(3) of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights (ECFR),14 Article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,'5 Article 27(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,16
Article 9, and Article 11(1) and (2) of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR);1 7 and Article 13 (1) of the
European Social Charter (ESC).18 In addition, following the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights, Article 1 of the first protocol of the
12. It should, however, be mentioned that studies on the effectivity of work-related sanctions are
almost exclusively limited to unemployment benefits and countries with relative low levels of
unemployment. See Anja Eleveld, Work-Related Sanctions in European Welfare States: An Incentive to
Work or a Violation of Minimum Subsistence Rights? 7 (Access Europe Research Paper No. 2016/01,
2016), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2802656. This Section also draws on Anja Eleveld, Rights to
Social Assistance and Sanctioning Policies across Europe: Recent Trends and Implications, 23 J.S.S.L
152-56 (2016).
13. Michael Adler, A New Leviathan: Benefit Sanctions in the Twenty-first Century, 43 J.L. & Soc'Y
195, 226 (2016).
14. Article 34(3) of the EU Treaty of Fundamental Rights stipulates "in order to combat social
exclusion and poverty, the Union recognizes and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as
to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance with the rules laid
down by Community law and national law and practices."
15. According to Article 25(1) UDHR, "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family."
16. According to Article 27(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, "States Parties
recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual,
moral and social development."
17. Article 9 ICESCR stipulates the right to social security. Point 16 of the General Comment to
Article 9 further states that at the expiry of the period of unemployment benefits, the social security system
should ensure adequate protection, for example, through a system of social assistance (General Comment
No. 19, adopted 23 November 2007 at the 39th session [doc.no. E/C.12.GC/19]). In case of
unemployment, Article 11(1) ICESCR recognizes "the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food clothing and hauling and to the continuous
improvement of living conditions."
18. Article 13(1) ESC states: "with a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social
and medical assistance, the Parties undertake (1) to ensure that any person who is without adequate
resources and who is unable to secure such resources either by his own efforts or from other sources, in
particular by benefits under a social security scheme be granted adequate assistance, and, in case of
sickness, the care necessitated by his condition."
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European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)'9 and Article 8 ECHR20
indirectly imply the right to minimum means of subsistence.21
Regarding their legal status and their scope of application, the social
rights enshrined in the ICESR and the ESC are important in particular. Article
11(1) ICESR recognizes, among other things, the right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living. Article 9 ICESCR stipulates the right to social
security and, according to the general comment to Article 9 ICESR, the right
to social security also includes the right to social assistance benefits.22 in its
statement of 2015 the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) declared that basic social security guarantees
constitute the core obligation of States to ensure access to social security
by providing, together with adequate access to essential services, a
minimum level of benefits to all individuals and families to enable them
to acquire at least essential health care, basic shelter and housing, water
and sanitation, food and the most basic forms of education.23
Hence, the CESCR intends to assure universal access to a minimum level of
benefits. At this point it should be noted that the guarantee of a universal
access to social benefits does not preclude the possibility to make these
benefits conditional on certain behavior requirements. Indeed, the CESCR
has argued for a fair and reasonable application of work-related conditions.
In this regard it has expressed its concerns regarding the imposition of work-
related conditions on disadvantaged groups.24 Compared to the CESCR, the
European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) has been more explicit when
it comes to work-related conditionality and sanctioning in social assistance
benefits. Whereas in the European context the ESC is the key legal
19. Article 1 of the first Protocol of ECHR recognizes the right to property. The case law of the
ECtHR shows that this right also applies to social assistance benefits.
20. According to Article 8 ECHR, "everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life,
his home and his correspondence." The ECtHR has stated in reference to Art. 8 ECHR that Article 8
does not merely compel the state to abstain from .. . interference; ... In addition to the
negative obligation to protect the individual against arbitrary action by the public
authorities, Art. 8 also contains positive obligations that is the State may also have to
act affirmatively to respect the wide range of personal interests.
ECtHR 26 March 1985, X & Y v. the Netherlands, 31.
21. However, the practical value of these rights for sanctioned recipients of social assistance will be
limited regarding the required balancing of interests (principle of fair balance), and the fact that national
states possess a great margin of appreciation in these cases. On the relation of the ECHR and the right to
cash benefits, see further IDA. E. KOCH, HUMAN RIGHTS AS INVISIBLE RIGHTS 179-207 (2009).
22. According to point 16 of the General Comment to Article 9 ICESCR, at the expiry of the period
of unemployment benefits the social security system should ensure adequate protection, for example
through a system of social assistance (General Comment No. 19, adopted 23 November 2007 at the 3 9 '
session [doc.no. E/C.12.GC/19]).
23. Statement of the CESCR, 15 April 2015 (E/C.12.2015/1).
24. Jennifer Tooze, The Rights to Social Security and Social Assistance: Towards an Analytical
Framework, in EcoNoMIc, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN ACTION 349 (Robert McCorquodale &
Mashood Baderin eds., 2007). See in this respect a few recent Conclusions of the CESCR: CESCR
Concluding Observations on the combined third to fifth periodic report of Romania, 9 December 2014
(E/C.12/ROU/CO/3-5); CESCR Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Slovenia, 15
December 2014 (E/C. 12/SVN/CO/2).
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instrument regulating social rights,25 the remainder of this section considers
the extent to which the ESC sets limits to work-related sanctions.
The right to social assistance nshrined in Article 13 ESC is closely
related to comparable provisions in other International Treaties. For example,
Article 13 ESC has been an important source for Article 34(3) of the ECFR.26
In addition, on several occasions the ECSR has considered that the ESC
should be interpreted in harmony with other rules of International Law of
which it forms part.27 This implies, among other things, that the ECSR
interprets Article 13(1) in conformity with the minimum core obligations of
the ICESR, such as the right to be free from hunger stated in Article 11 (2).28
In 1969, in its statement on Article 13 ESC, the ECSR argued that "the
Contracting Parties are no longer merely empowered to grant assistance as
they think fit; they are under an obligation, which they may be called on in
court to honour."29 This statement shows that the Contracting Parties ought
to take the right to social assistance seriously. Setting the poverty threshold
at 50% of the median equivalized income,30 the ECSR has decided with
respect to a great number of European countries, that their social protection
systems do not comply with this threshold. In addition, it has imposed three
restrictions on the reduction, suspension or termination of the entitlement to
social assistance due to a (work-related) sanction:
1. The conditions should be "reasonable and consistent with the
aim pursued, that is to say to find a lasting solution to the
individual's difficulties";
2. Reduction, suspension or termination should "not deprive the
person concerned of his/her means of subsistence";
3. "[I]t must be possible to appeal against a decision to suspend or
reduce assistance."31
The Conclusions of the ECSR have most times addressed the second
point ("not to deprive the person concerned of his/her means of subsistence"),
in particular by asking the ratifying states to provide additional information
in order to assess whether a sanctioned recipient still has access to adequate
means of subsistence. For example, in its Conclusions of 2010, the ECSR
asked the Dutch government for information regarding the regulation of
25. MATI MIKKOLA, SOCIAL HuMAN RIGTHS OF EUROPE 58 (2010).
26. See the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (O.J. 2007/C 303/27).
27. See, e.g., International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. France; Complaint no.
14/2003, decision on the merits of 8 September 2004, § 26.
28. CESCR, General Comment 3, The nature of state obligations (1990), UN Doc. E/1991/23, 14
December 1990, 10.
29. ECSR, Conclusions 1, Statement of Interpretation of Art. 13 para. I of the ESC, 31 May 1969.
30. This is lower than the poverty threshold set by the European Commission that sets it 60% of the
median equivalized income.
31. Digest of the case law of the European Committee of Social Rights, 98 (2008).
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work-related sanctions in the national social assistance legislation.32 In its
Conclusions of 2013, the ECSR noted that the Dutch government has
reported that social assistance benefits may be partly or entirely reduced for
up to three months if there is some form of culpability.33 Once the reduction
period has elapsed, the municipality must reassess the situation. It is not clear,
however, whether the ECSR is satisfied with this report as the Committee has
deferred its Conclusion pending some other questions.
In other occasions the ECSR has firmly stated that it does not accept that
the application to social assistance benefits are rejected, or that social
assistance benefits are withdrawn, because the person concerned has not
complied with employment integration schemes, failed to register with the
competent employment service, or to accept a job. This was reported, for
example, in the Conclusions concerning Luxembourg34 and Croatia.35
However, the ECSR seems to condone work-related sanctions in cases where
the national legislation provides for some kind of safety net income that
replaces social assistance benefits in case a sanction has been imposed. For
example, the ECSR asked the Portuguese government to confirm that
exceptional short-term benefits of limited amounts covering minimum
subsistence expenses are available to people whose benefits have been
suspended for not accepting a suitable employment offer.36 In the case of the
United Kingdom, the ECSR has asked further questions concerning the
hardship clauses in the British jobseekers legislation,37 and in the case of
Lithuania the ECSR explicitly accepted the present hardship clauses.3 1 In
sum, the ECSR Conclusions additionally suggest that, unless the state has
adopted appropriate hardship clauses, work-related sanctions may
contravene the right to minimum means of subsistence.
The first point ("reasonable and consistent with the aim of finding a
lasting solution to the individual's difficulties") gets less attention from the
ECSR. This point is comparable with the argument of the CESCR for a fair
and reasonable application of work-related conditions. CESCR and the ECSR
thus both acknowledge that (in addition to low levels of social assistance) the
imposition of work-related sanctions may leave the (former) recipient of
social assistance without sufficient means of subsistence. This is allowed as
long as the sanctions are reasonable and consistent with the aim pursued.
However, one can wonder whether all national regulations would stand this
test. In a number of national minimum income legislations, then, work
32. ECSR Conclusions, decision of I February 2010 (No. 2009/def/NLD/13/1/EN).
33. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 12 June 2013, session 263 (2013/def/NLD/13/1/EN).
34. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 1 February 2010 (XlX-2/def/LUX/13/l/EN).
35. ECSR Conclusions, decision of4 March 2014, session No. 270 (XX-2/def/HRV/13/l/EN).
36. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 12 June 2013, session No. 271 (2013/def/PRT/13/1/EN).
37. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 12 June 2013, session No. 268 (XX-2/def/GBR/l3/1/EN).
38. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 12 June 2013, session No. 264 (2013/def/LTU/13/1/EN).
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conditions seem to have been implemented solely with the aim of making
welfare dependency as unattractive as possible.39 In addition, the question
can be raised why the ECSR only mentions hardship clauses as a possible
(and necessary) mitigating clause. For example, a reparatory clause that
stipulates that benefits are to be restored as soon as the sanctioned recipient
complies with his or her obligations, clearly contributes to the reasonableness
and the consistency of the sanction system. Moreover, as was noted above, a
right to minimum means of subsistence is not inherently inconsistent with a
conditional right to subsistence. Yet, sanctions that extend beyond the period
of noncompliance will appear more punitive in nature and require a more
complicated justification in terms of conditionality. Discretionary clauses
and good reasons clauses may also contribute to the reasonableness and
consistency of the sanction system in that they enable the case manager not
to impose the sanction in specific circumstances, including those concerning
hardship. The next section examines all four mitigating clauses-the
hardship clause, the reparatory clause, the good reasons clause, and the
discretionary clause-in more detail.
III. MITIGATING INSTRUMENTS
How do mitigation clauses in sanctioning regimes work? Suppose that
the safety net system in countries A and B are based on social assistance
benefits and that, according to the social assistance legislation, the benefits
will be reduced 100% for a period of three months in case a recipient commits
a work-related fault. Suppose that in both countries a recipient is punished
because he or she refuses to participate in an employment program, and that
it is not likely that this recipient will be hired within the next three months
because their employment prospects are low. Suppose also that country A has
not adopted any mitigation clause. As a result, the income of the sanctioned
recipient will probably fall far below poverty rates. By contrast, country B
has adopted three important mitigation mechanisms in its social assistance
regulations. First, the sanction regulation includes a "can" clause. Hence, the
decision-maker has discretionary space to decide whether he or she applies
the sanction after the recipient has committed a fault. Second, country B has
adopted reparatory measures, as a result of which the benefits are restored as
soon as the welfare recipient fulfills his or her obligations. Third, country B
has adopted a hardship clause, according to which the sanctioned welfare
recipient is still able to apply for some allowances to buy food after a sanction
has been imposed.
39. See, e.g., AMIR PAZ-FUCHS, WELFARE-TO-WORK: CONDITIONING RIGHTS IN SOCIAL POLICY
(2008).
39. ECSR Conclusions, decision of 1 February 2010 (No. 2009/def/NLD/13/l/EN).
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It will be clear that, despite the fact that country B has adopted a similar
sanction rule, the effects of the sanction will be mitigated in various ways.
First, the sanction may not be imposed because of the "can" clause
(discretionary clause) and/or because of the fact that the recipient provides
good reasons for his or her refusal (good reasons clause). In addition, the
sanction may be withdrawn immediately because the recipient changes their
mind after he or she has received a sanction and decides to participate in the
employment. Finally, where the sanction is not repaired and the decision
maker decides to impose the full sanction, the presence of a hardship clause
may allow the recipient to buy food during this period. In sum, in terms of
income support, in all three scenarios, the sanctioned social assistance
recipient in country B will be better off compared to the sanctioned recipient
in country A. In this section we will have a closer look at discretionary
clauses, good reasons clauses, reparatory clauses, and hardship clauses.
Clauses that allow for discretionary space are important because these
effectively leave the decision maker "free to make a choice among possible
courses of action or inaction."4 0 In general, discretionary clauses have gained
importance since the emergence of a contractual mode of thinking and
regulation in social assistance regimes in European welfare states, where,
instead of an almost unconditional right to basic social assistance, social
rights have been increasingly linked to sanctions-backed behavioral
conditions.41 It is up to the decision maker to decide in individual cases which
conditions have to be fulfilled, whether the recipient has complied with these
conditions and whether and how the recipient who has not complied with the
(work-related) conditions hould be sanctioned. Where a discretionary clause
leaves it to the decision maker to impose a sanction (i.e., "a sanction can be
imposed"), the decision maker has the power not to apply the sanction that
has been regulated in law. As a result, the recipient has at least a chance to
be better off, compared to the situation where the decision maker is obliged
to impose a sanction (i.e., "a sanction should be imposed").
In addition, a national social assistance scheme may have adopted good
reasons clauses, which are particularly relevant in the absence of an explicit
discretionary clause as described above. A good reason clause stipulates that
the sanction is not imposed where the welfare recipient has good reasons for
committing the fault. Hence, the presence of a good reasons clause may
mandate outcomes in particular cases, thereby constraining the discretion of
case-managers who might otherwise refuse to mitigate. For example, a good
40. KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 4 (1969).
41. For a development of contractualism in North-Western European welfare states, see, e.g., the
contributions in NEW CONTRACTUALISM IN EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE POLITICS (Rune Ervik, Nanna
Kildal & Even Nilssen eds., 2015). This book builds on ELS SOL & MIES WESTERVELD,
CONTRACTUALISM IN EMPLOYMENT SERVICES: A NEW FORM OF WELFARE STATE GOVERNANCE (2005).
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reasons clause may stipulate that the case manager is obliged to reconsider
the imposition of a sanction in case the sanctioned recipient has been ill.
There may exist a thin line only between a general "exemption" clause
for disabled and ill recipients, for example, and a good reason clause
stipulating that illness constitutes a good reason not to comply with a work-
related obligation. Related to this, it should be noticed that the stipulation of
a good reasons clause depends on the definition of work. Widening the
definition of work that, for example, also includes participation in all kinds
of "pre-employment" activities addressing emotional and medical issues, has
the effect that good reasons clauses cover more contingencies. Likewise,
widening the definition of work increases the possible scope of hardship that
may have an effect on the wordings of these clauses (e.g., explicit reference
may be made to disabled people and primary caregivers).4 2 Where work
requirements are more and more conceived of as an obligation to "do
something in return" for the benefits,4 3 exemption clauses may also be
abolished in favor of a universal participation policy." In this study,
however, we did not examine the relationship between exemption clauses,
good reasons clauses, hardship clauses, and the definition of work.
The implementation of discretionary clauses does not, however,
necessarily benefit the recipient of social assistance. While, on the one hand,
the attention to the particularity of singular cases implies that public services
are more tailored to accommodate different groups (i.e., that the diversity and
the needs of individual are properly addressed);45 on the other hand, research
has shown that recipients of social assistance are increasingly "at the mercy
of' the street-level bureaucrat because of the increased use of discretionary
clauses.46 In addition, various scholars have shown how non-legal
considerations, such as management goals that are based on efficiency
considerations and prevailing norms that "the recipient has to do something
in return for his benefits" have affected the ways that discretionary space has
42. See Zats, supra note 6, at 421-22; Noah D. Zats, Welfare to What, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1131, 1157-
63 (2006).
43. See Anja Eleveld, The Duty to Work Without a Wage. A Legal Comparison between Social
Assistance Legislation in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 16 EUR. J. Soc. Soc'Y 218
2014).
44. For example, in the Netherlands the possibility to oblige recipients to do something in return for
the benefits was introduced in 2012. Since 2015 municipalities have been obliged to implement this
provision, at the same time, the range of exemptions of the work requirement has been limited. I thank an
anonymous referee for his or her remark to distinguish the good reasons clause more sharply from the
discretionary clause and to relate the content of the good reasons clause and the exemptions to the work
related obligation to the changed definition of work in social assistance legislations.
45. Kaspar Villadsen, Ambiguous Citizenship: 'Postmodern' versus 'Modern' Welfare at the
Margins, 12 DISTINKTION: SCANANDINIVAN J. Soc. THEORY 309 (2011).
46. There is a whole strand of literature that could be cited here. In this context the most important
are WORK AND THE WELFARE STATE: STREET-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS AND WORKFARE POLnrics
(Evelyn Z. Brodkin & Gregory Marston eds., 2013); MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY:
DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980); THE GOVERNANCE OF ACTIVE WELFARE
STATES (Rik van Berkel, Willibrord de Graaf & Toms Sirovdtka eds., 2011).
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been used in practice,47 including the kind of reasoning used in the exercise
of discretional power to impose a sanction.48 Hence, from this perspective,
the application of discretionary clauses have-instead of improving-
reduced recipient's access to basic social rights. These reservations should be
kept in mind in particular with respect to reparatory clauses and hardship
clauses that, in most cases, leave discretion to the decision maker to decide
whether the recipient complies with work-related obligations or whether the
sanctioned recipient is entitled to hardship payments. Both mitigation clauses
will be examined in more detail below.
The clause that the benefits will be paid after the fault has been repaired
(e.g., the recipient agrees to participate in an employment program) is an
example of a reparatory clause. Hence, normally, a reparation clause
"softens" the sanction. However, this will not be the case in all situations. I
will briefly discuss three of these situations where a reparatory clause will
not necessarily benefit the recipient.
First, as was noted above, the decision maker will mostly enjoy some
scope of discretion as to whether and how to apply the reparation clause. In
other words, he or she may also ignore the possibility of repair. In that case
a recipient would have been better off in a system that has stipulated a fixed
short period of the reduction (e.g., one month), compared to a system
containing a reparatory clause without stipulating a maximum length of the
reduction (e.g., the benefits are restored as soon as the recipient fulfills his or
her obligations). In case the recipient in the first system persists in their fault,
the decision maker is at least forced to reconsider the sanction after a month.
In the second system, the benefits may be reduced for a much longer period.
Second, the presence of reparatory clauses may prevent the applicability
of Article 6 ECHR, which protects the right to a fair trial.49 As a result the
managerial power will increase at the cost of the legal protection of social
rights.50 This point can be illustrated in the following way. Suppose that in
47. Various recent studies have reached this conclusion. See, e.g., Dorte Caswell & Mathilde
Haybye-Mortensen, How Organizations and Street-level Bureaucrats Deal with Economic Sanctions, 17
EUR. J. Soc. Soc'Y 31-51 (2015); Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Policy Work: Street-level Organizations under New
Managerialism, 21 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY SUPPLEMENT i253 (2011); WORK AND THE WELFARE
STATE, supra note 46; Even Nilssen, Contractualism and Street-level Discretion in Norwegian Activation
Policy, in NEW CONTRACTUALISM IN EUROPEAN WELFARE STATE POLITICS 73-92 (Rune Ervik, Nanna
Kildal, & Even Nilssen eds., 2015); Joe Soss, Richard Fording & Sanford F. Schram, The Organization
ofDiscipline. From Performance Management to Perversity and Punishment, 21 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &
THEORY SUPPLEMENT i203 (2011); PAUL VAN AERSCHOT, ACTIVATION POLICIES AND THE PROTECTION
OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITAUTION IN DENMARK, FINLAND AND
SWEDEN (2011).
48. Molander et al. refer in this context to "epistemic discretion." See Anders Molander, Harald
Grimen & Erik 0. Eriksen, Professional Discretion andAccountability in the Welfare State, 29 J. APPLIED
PHIL. 219 (2012).
49. Article 6 ECHR only applies to punitive sanctions.
50. Michael Adler, Conditionality, Sanctions and the Weakness of Redress Mechanisms in the
British "New Deal, " in WORK AND THE WELFARE STATE: STREET-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS AND
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country B (that has adopted a reparatory clause in national social assistance
legislation), a sanctioned recipient argues that his or her benefits should be
restored at 100% since he or she now fulfills the obligations. Suppose that
the decision maker does not fully agree with the recipient and refuses to
withdraw the sanction. In this situation the recipient does not enjoy the right
to a fair trial of 6 ECHR, whereas he or she would have been protected by
this provision in case the reparatory clause had been absent. Thirdly, the
presence of a reparation clause may have no practical effect whatsoever,
because the recipient is not aware of the possibility of repair.
Yet, notwithstanding these three reservations, it could be argued that,
generally speaking, reparation clauses reduce the harshness of a sanction in
important ways. This point has been insufficiently recognized in current
studies, as a result of which quite different sanction clauses have been
assessed in similar ways. For example, in a recent OECD study on the
eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits, the sanctions for Romania
were valued higher (2 points) compared to the Netherlands (1 point),
indicating that Romania has adopted higher sanctions. However, this
valuation did not do justice to the fact that, in Romania, benefits are
immediately restored after re-application, whereas in the Netherlands
benefits are cut for a fixed period of four weeks.51
The hardship clause constitutes a fourth type of mitigation clause. This
clause that prevents hardship for the sanctioned recipient, often applies to
recipients with dependent children. Hardship clauses can be regulated at
either the national or regional level. In both cases the application of hardship
clauses presupposes a broad margin of discretion for the decision maker. To
illustrate this point, consider the discretionary hardship clause in the Irish
social assistance legislation that stipulates that where a claimant with a family
loses his or her payment (due to a sanction), the qualified adult can apply for
a supplementary welfare payment on their own behalf and that of the
children. It is up to the decision maker to decide whether these supplementary
welfare payments are granted.52
In sum, discretionary clauses, good reasons clauses, reparatory clauses,
and hardship clauses are the main instruments mitigating work-related
sanctions. These clauses contribute to the reasonableness and consistency of
the sanction system in the meaning of the CESCR and the ECSR. It should
be noted, however, that a hardship clause within a comprehensive social
WORKFARE POLITICS 229-48 (Evelyn Z. Brodkin and Greogry Marston eds., 2013); VAN AERSCHOT,
supra note 47.
51. Langenbucher, supra note 10, at 62-63.
52. The discretionary character of hardship clauses is to some extent comparable with the
discretionary character of emergency assistance and special needs benefits that complemented welfare
benefits in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, that, according to Handler and Sosin, were often
"miserly, illogical and hedged with restrictions." See JOEL F. HANDLER & MICHAEL SOSlN, LAST
RESORTS: EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE AND SPECIAL NEEDS PROGRAMS IN PUBLIC WELFARE 12 (1983).
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benefits system may be functionally equivalent to a system where specific
benefits, such as child benefits or rent subsidies, remain available after the
imposition of a sanction. This is the case when these benefits are not part of
a social assistance benefits.53 In addition, in some social assistance regimes
containing distinct components for children, paternity, heating, and rent, a
work-related sanction doesnot affect all components; this depends on the
design of the system. Obviously, in national systems where this is the case
(e.g., the social benefits regimes in Germany and the United Kingdom), a
sanctioned single parent with children will be better off compared to a system
where all social assistance components are affected, such as the Dutch
system.54 In this study I have focused on the legislation of mitigation clauses
in social assistance regimes, but in order to nuance these data I have also
gathered data on non-sanctioned components of social assistance benefits.
IV. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WORK-RELATED SANCTIONS AND
MITIGATION CLAUSES IN SOCIAL ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION IN TWENTY-
FIvE EUROPEAN WELFARE STATES
Work-related sanctions are central to activation policies in European
welfare states. The imposition of a work-related sanction may, however,
violate the right to basic means of subsistence. This section investigates to
what extent European ational welfare states have implemented mitigation
clauses in their social assistance regimes and to what extent sanctions are
mitigated due to the differentiation in benefit components.
A. Data and Methods
For this part of the research, legal and social policy specialists-mostly
affiliated with a university-were asked to complete questionnaires for
twenty-five European countries. I consulted labor law and social security law
specialists of the Labour Law Research Network (LLRN) and social policy
specialists, mainly via the European Social Policy Network (ESPN). The goal
of this project was to investigate the level of sanctioning in all EU Member
States, the European Economic Area,55 and Switzerland. However, it was not
possible to find country specialists for all countries during the term of the
research. In addition, some countries had to be skipped because the provided
data was not adequate. As a result, the final country selection included
twenty-three EU Member States, Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Bulgaria
53. For an excellent overview of minimum income benefit in welfare states, see J. Wang & O.P. van
Vliet, Social Assistance and Minimum Income Benefits: Benefit Levels, Replacement Rates and Policies
Across 26 OECD Countries, 1990-2009,18 EuR. J. Soc. Soc'Y 333 (2016).
54. A. Eleveld, The Duty to Work without a Wage. A Legal Comparison between Social Assistance
Legislation in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 16 EUR. J. Soc. SoC'y 218 (2014).
55. Except for Lichtenstein.
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(BU), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Denmark (DK), Spain (ES),
Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Croatia (HR), Ireland (IE), Italy
(IT), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), the Netherlands (NL), Poland (PL),
Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), Sweden (SE),
United Kingdom (UK), one country from the European Economic Area
(NO), and Switzerland (CH).
The questionnaire contained questions on financial sanctions that,
according to the national or regional legislation on non-contributory social
assistance, can be imposed on recipients of social assistance who fail to fulfill
one or more of the work-related requirements:
1. register with an employment office;
2. sign an integration or insertion contract;
3. comply with job research requirement;
4. participate in a job community program;
5. participate in a training program;
6. participate in an employment program;
7. other.
In addition, the questionnaire contained questions on the presence of
mitigation clauses, such as discretionary clauses, reparatory clauses, and
hardship clauses. Finally we asked which components of social assistance
benefits were sanctioned.
The country specialists were asked to fill out the questionnaires for the
situation as of January 1, 2015.56 As in Austria and Switzerland social
assistance benefits are entirely regulated at the local level, the regulations
were examined at the this level (i.e., for Austria, the city of Vienna and for
Switzerland the Canton of Zirich).57 It should further be noted that some
countries, such as Spain, Italy,58 Bulgaria,59 and Croatia.60 have adopted
rather limited social assistance benefits. For Spain it was therefore decided
to examine the national unemployment benefits.61
56. With the exception of Italy where we also considered some important legislative changes in
2015.
57. Spain has a decentralized system. The regulations of Catalonia where examined, however, since
the reform of2011 this region has limited social assistance benefits (PRMI benefits to people with special
and additional needs. See Patti per il riscatto sociale (Milan) (Pacts for the advancement of social
conditions).
58. Able-bodied people are only eligible for social assistance benefits when they are unemployed
and at least one member of the household is under the age of eighteen, or over fifty-five, and does not
(yet) qualify for a retirement scheme.
59. Able-bodied people are only eligible for social assistance benefits after a waiting period of six
months.
60. Able-bodied people are eligible for social assistance benefits for a maximum period of three
years. People can only re-apply for social assistance benefits after a period of three months.
61. Workers are eligible for unemployment benefits where they have contributed for at least 180
days. The duration of these benefits is limited. Only claimants older than fifty-two years may receive
benefits until retirement. This shows that in Spain there are important gaps in the social assistance scheme,
particularly with respect to first time job seekers and long-term unemployed under fifty-two years.
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B. Results and Analysis
Table 1 provides an overview of the kind of work-related sanctions that
are imposed on recipients who fail to fulfill one of the six work-related
requirements. In most countries different work-related sanctions apply
depending on the kind of work-related fault that has been committed and on
the extent of recidivism (i.e., a first, second or third fault). Table 2 presents
five different mitigation mechanisms in the national legislations:
discretionary clauses (DS), good reasons clauses (GRC), reparatory measures
(RM), hardship clauses (HS), and the number of components sanctioned
(CS).
Table 1
The Period of the Reduced Benefits or Termination and the Percentage
of the Reduction
Country Termination Fixed Number of Reduction Percentage, length and
period faults number of faults
AT No - Yes 0-50%, no minimum or
maximum length. After
repeated fault, 50-100%,
no minimum or maximum
length.
BE No - Yes 0-100% for maximum one
month. After repeated
fault, 100% for maximum
three months.
BG Yes 1 year After a first Yes 100% for two months.
fault. After a second fault, 100%
for two years.6
2
CH No - Yes 15%, no maximum length.
After repeated fault, 15%
or more, on the condition
that the benefits are set at a
decent minimum level, for
a maximum 12 months.
CZ Yes 3 months After a first No
fault.
62. Whether the benefits are terminated reduced depends on the type of work-related fault that is
committed.
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DE Yes - After a third Yes 30% for three months.
fault. After a second fault, 60%
for three months.
DK Yes - Yes 15% for one month or
100% no minimum or
maximum length.
EE Yes 90 days After a first Yes 100%, no minimum or
fault. maximum length after a
second fault.6 3
ES Yes No Yes 100% for one month. After
second fault, 100% for
three months. After a third
fault, 100% for six
months. 4
Fl No - Yes 0-20% for maximum two
months. After repeated
fault, 0-40% for two
months. The reduction can
only be made if it will not
endanger a living essential
in providing security
needed for a life of human
dignity.
FR Yes No After a third Yes 80% for 1-3 months. After
fault. a second fault, 100% for 1-
4 months.
HR Yes 6 months After a first No
fault.
IE Yes 9 weeks After a Yes 50% for 21 days after a
second fault. first fault.
IT Yes 2 months After a first, Yes 25% for one month after a
second, or first fault. 100% for one
third fault. month after a second
fault.
65
LT Yes 6 months After a first Yes 100% no minimum or
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NL No - Yes Variable percentage, no
minimum or maximum
percentage or 100% for
maximum one month.
After repeated faults,
100% for maximum three
months.
67
NO Yes No Yes Variable up to a decent
minimum level, no
maximum length.
PL Yes No Yes 0-100%, no minimum or
maximum length.
PT Yes 2 years After a first No
fault.
RO Yes No After second Yes 100% for maximum three
fault months.
SI Yes 6 months After a first No
fault.
SK No - Yes 100% for two months.
After repeated fault, 50%
for maximum 10
subsequent months.





UK No No Yes 100% for 4 or 13 weeks.
After a second fault, 100 %
for 13 or 26 weeks. After a
third fault, 100% for 13 or
156 weeks.
67. Id.
466 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL'Y JOURNAL [Vol. 39:449
Table 2
Discretionary Space (DS), Good Reasons Clause (GRC), Reparatory
Measures (RM), Hardship Clauses (HS), and Number of Components
Sanctioned
DS GRC RM HS Components not sanctioned
AT 68 + + - Children, rent, and heating
BE + + - + -
BG - - .
CH + + + + -
CZ - + - + Children
DE - + _69 + Paternity, children, rent, and heating
DK - + +70 - .
EE - + -
ES +71 +
FI + + + + Children, rent, and partner
FR +72 + - + Children and partner7 3
HR - - - - (only termination)
IE + + + + Rent and heating
IT - + -
LT - + +74 - Heating
68. According to the regulation in Vienna, benefits are to be reduced in steps down to 50%, in case
of persistent refusal a further reduction down 100% is possible. This clause conveys both discretionary
and non-discretionary elements. I have interpreted it as non-discretionary.
69. In Germany a reparatory clause applies only after the third fault. In that case the benefits will not
be terminated but (like the second fault) reduced with 60%. Whereas no reparatory clause applies after the
first or second fault I have scored the legislation as not containing reparatory clauses.
70. In Denmark there are different kinds of sanctions, dependent on the kind of fault that is
committed. There is no possibility for reparation where a mild sanction applies (i.e., more or less 15%
reduction). See also Section IV.A, infra.
71. In cases of reduction there exists a wide discretion. In cases of termination there is no discretion.
We look here at reduction.
72. In France, the decision maker only has discretionary space with respect to the imposition after
the first and second fault. After the third fault (which results in termination) there is no discretion.
73. In France, all components are sanctioned. However, benefits are only sanctioned for 50% where
the household consists of more than one person.
74. In Lithuania there are only reparatory measures with respect to the first fault, but not with respect
to repeated faults.
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LU + + +75 - (only termination)
NL - +76 + + 77
NO + + + + -
PL + + + + -
PT - - (only termination)
RO - - + - Heating
SE + + + + -
SI - +
SK - - - - Children and partner
UK - + - + Children and rent
A comparison between Table 1 and Table 2 reveals that all countries
either reduce the benefits with 100%, or terminate them, after the recipient
has committed a (repeated) work-related fault, except for Fl, NO, SE, and
CH ((Zurich). These four countries have all stipulated that benefits are
reduced only on the condition that they are set at a decent minimum level. In
addition, these countries have adopted all four mitigation clauses. At the
other end of the scale we find seven countries that terminate the benefits or
reduce them with 100% after a first fault for at least two months (BG, CZ,
HR, LT, PT, SI, and SK).78 Regarding the Conclusions of the CESCR and
the ECSR, these countries in particular ought to stipulate mitigation clauses.
However, of these only three countries have stipulated (maximum two)
mitigation clauses.
In order to provide a more precise picture of the relationship between
the harshness of the sanction and the number of mitigation clauses, I also
constructed a sanction indicator. The advantage of this indicator is that it is
based on the most important indicators characterizing the variety of
sanctions. Hence, instead of (partly) formulating criteria in advance, the
criteria were entirely deducted from the data. As is shown in Table 3, various
criteria were taken into account, including the number of work-related
75. In Luxemburg there are only reparatory measures with respect to the first fault, but not with
respect to repeated faults.
76. In the Netherlands a sanction will not be imposed when the recipient is without any blame.
77. Although it must be noted that since the legislative change of January 2015, the child component
that was included in the benefits for single parents is conferred to other income related (tax) benefits. As
a result, the single parent whose social assistance benefits are sanctioned will now save more benefits
compared to the period before 2015.
78. This group only includes countries that impose a fixed period of termination or 100% reduction
for all work-related faults. Therefore, Estonia and Italy are excluded from this group.
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behaviors that are sanctioned, recidivism, the period of reduced benefits
payments or termination, the percentage of the reduction of the benefits, and
the flexibility of the periods and percentages of reduction. In order to
calculate a sanction indicator for each country, each indicator counted for one
point. It should be noted at this point that a few countries have adopted
different sanctions for different kinds of work-related faults. Because a high
sanction has a stronger effect on the income of recipients of social assistance
compared to a low-sanction, it was decided to focus on the highest sanctions
regime.
Table 3
Elements of the Sanction Indicator
1. Sanctions are imposed on five or more ALMP related faults.
2. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first fault for a fixed period of six
months and more.
3. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first, second or third fault for a fixed
period of twelve months and more.
4. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first fault for a fixed period.
5. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first, second, or third fault with
and/or without a fixed time period (i.e., immediate reparation of the fault is
possible) and excluding those countries who have adopted a discretionary
clause with regard to the percentage of the sanction (i.e., up to 100%).
6. Termination or a reduction of 100% after a first, second, or third fault, with
and/or without a fixed time period (i.e., immediate reparation of the fault is
possible) and including those countries who have adopted a discretionary clause
with regard to the percentage of the sanction (i.e., up to 100%).
7. 100% reduction, fixed period of one month or more after a first, second, or third
fault.
8. Termination or reduction of more than 50% (i.e., 51% and more) after a first
fault, excluding those countries who have adopted a discretionary clause with
regard to the percentage of the sanction (i.e., up to 100%).
9. Termination or reduction of more than 50% (i.e., 51% and more) after a first,
second or third fault, including those countries who have adopted a
discretionary clause with regard to the percentage of the sanction (i.e., up to
100%).
Figure 1
High-Sanction Indicator Excluding Mitigation and Number of
Mitigation Clauses
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Figure 1 compares the sanction indicator with the number of mitigation
clauses. This Figure clearly illustrates that welfare states that have adopted
higher sanctions tend to have adopted less mitigation clauses. Indeed, there
is a high (negative) Spearman correlation between these variables (-0.742).79
Regarding the remark in Section II that reparatory measures may justify
conditional access to minimum subsistence benefits, note that out of thirteen
countries that score relatively high on the sanction indicator (between 6-9)
only two countries have adopted reparatory measures (LT and LU) and in
both countries these reparatory clauses only apply after a first fault.
Comparing the sanction indicator with the stipulation of a hardship
clause, the results show that out of thirteen countries that score relatively high
on the sanction indicator, only three countries have stipulated a hardship
clause (UK, CZ, and FR). By contrast, out of the twelve countries that score
lower on the sanction indicator (between 1 and 5) only three countries have
not stipulated a hardship clause (RO, DK, and AT). Where a country has not
regulated a hardship clause, the sanctioned recipients may still have access
to some benefits, depending on the composition of the benefits and the
sanctioning system. Table 2 shows that in ten social assistance regimes not
all components are sanctioned. However, only in four out of thirteen
countries that score relatively high on the sanction indicator a sanction is not
imposed on all components of the social assistance benefits and these include
all high sanctioning countries that have also stipulated a hardship clause (i.e.,
UK, CZ, and FR).
V. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
The ECSR Conclusions suggest that, unless the state has adopted
appropriate hardship clauses, work-related sanctions may contravene the
right to minimum means of subsistence. However, the ECSR (and the
CESCR) also hold that work requirements in social assistance regulations are
reasonable and consistent with the aim of finding a lasting solution to the
individual's difficulties. This article therefore argues that Treaty states should
not only implement hardship clauses, but also reparatory clauses, good
reasons clauses, and discretionary clauses in their sanctioning regimes in
order to prevent the violation of the right to minimum means of subsistence.
Based on this conclusion, this article examines the adoption of work-related
sanctions and mitigation mechanisms in twenty-five European welfare states.
The main findings reveal a reverse relationship between the strictness of the
work-related sanction and the number of mitigation clauses. This could be
described as the "sanctions mitigation paradox": in those countries where,
79. Significant at 0,000. Even if we omit reparatory clauses as they are partly contained in the
sanction indicator, the correlations between the variables remains -0,639 (significant at 0,001).
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from a social rights perspective, mitigation clauses are needed most, hey are
hardly or not regulated in social assistance legislation. Moreover, an
alternative mitigation mechanism that excludes some components of social
assistance benefits from the sanctioning regime was also less available in
regimes that have adopted the highest sanctions.
Why is this the case? It could be hypothesized that regarding welfare to
work policies, some welfare state types prefer sanctioning measures (i.e., "the
stick") over (expensive) training facilities (i.e., "the carrot"). These countries
will not only regulate high sanctions, but also less mitigation measures in
order to be as effective as possible. Note in this respect that while the Post-
communist European type and the Mediterranean welfare state type are
overrepresented among the countries that score relatively high on the
sanction indicator,80 the social-democratic welfare state type and the
conservative welfare state type are overrepresented among the countries that
rank relatively low on the sanction indicator. A final answer to the "sanctions
mitigation paradox" would require more research on the relationship between
sanctioning policies and welfare state type.
Countries that score high on the sanction indicator, such as Portugal,
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovakia are at risk in particular of violating the right
to an adequate standard of living and the right to social assistance enshrined
in the ICESCR and ESC. These countries, then, have adopted very high
sanctions without regulating any mitigation clause. In addition, in these
countries the sanction is imposed on all social assistance components.
In general, the research findings support Handler's aforementioned
conclusion that policies of social inclusion of welfare recipients may very
well end up in their social exclusion.81 However, in order to provide a more
precise judgment regarding the possible violations of social rights, more data
will be needed, such as the availability of other minimum benefits (briefly
mentioned in Section III) and the practical implementation of sanction
provisions and mitigation clauses. In addition, future research on the
mitigation of work-related sanction should address the relationship between
the definition of work (requirements), the formulation of exemption clauses,
good reasons clauses and hardship clauses (see Section III).
From the viewpoint of fundamental social rights, I want to close this
article with three policy recommendations. First, policy makers could be
more keen on possible ways of mitigating work-related sanctions. Preferable,
provisions on work-related sanctions include all four types of mitigation
80. I refer here the welfare state types used by GOSTA ESPING ANDERSON, THE THREE WORLDS OF
CAPITALISM (1990); Menno Fenger, Welfare Regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating
Post-Communist Countries in a Welfare Regime Typology, 3 CONTEMP. ISSUES & IDEAS IN SOC. ScI. 1
(2007); Enanuele Ferragina & Martin Seeleib-Kaiser, Welfare Regime Debate: Past, Present, Futures?,
39 POL'Y & POL. 583 (2011).
81. HANDER, supra note 4.
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clauses. Second, it is recommended not to impose sanctions on all
components of social assistance benefits. The additional advantage is that
it-in particular where the rent component is not sanctioned-may prevent
the accumulation of debts and consequently eviction. Third, welfare states
could also follow the example of Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland
to stipulate that benefits are reduced only on the condition that they are set at
a decent minimum level. However, also in these welfare states the monitoring
of the implementation of work-related sanctions remain crucial.82
Appendix 1
Legislation That has Been Considered for this Study
Country Name Legislation (date and source)
English translation (date and source)
Austria Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund und den Landern gemdi Art. 15a B-VG iiber
eine bundesweite Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung (Beschluss, 1-12-2010,
STF: LGBI Nr 27/2011).
Agreement Between the Federal and State Governments About a Nationwide
Demand-Oriented Minimum Benefit (Decision of 1 December 2010. STF: LGBI
Nr 27/2011).
Wiener Mindestsicherungsgesetz (Gesetz, 31-8-2010, S 040-000).
Vienna Act on Minimum Benefits (Law of31 August 2010, S 040-000).
Belgium Wet van 26 mei 2002 betreffende het recht op maatschappelijke integratie (26 mei
2002, nr. 2002022557, p. 33610).
Act concerning the Right to Social Integration (Law of26 May 2002, No.
2002022557, p. 33610).
Bulgaria 3aKon 3a coziuatnno nodnomaease (Ompa3ena denomunayusma om 05.07.1999 e)
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